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Abstract
Optical character recognition (OCR) is widely applied in real
applications serving as a key preprocessing tool. The adop-
tion of deep neural network (DNN) in OCR results in the
vulnerability against adversarial examples which are crafted
to mislead the output of the threat model. Different from
vanilla colorful images, images of printed text have clear
backgrounds usually. However, adversarial examples gener-
ated by most of the existing adversarial attacks are unnatural
and pollute the background severely. To address this issue, we
propose a watermark attack method to produce natural dis-
tortion that is in the disguise of watermarks and evade human
eyes’ detection. Experimental results show that watermark at-
tacks can yield a set of natural adversarial examples attached
with watermarks and attain similar attack performance to the
state-of-the-art methods in different attack scenarios.
Introduction
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is a widely adopted
application for conversing printed or handwritten images
to text, which becomes a critical preprocessing component
in text analysis pipelines, such as document retrieval and
summarization. OCR has been significantly improved in re-
cent years thanks to the wide adoption of the deep neural
network (DNN), and thus deployed in many critical appli-
cations where OCR’s quality is vital. For example, photo-
based ID recognition depends on OCR’s quality to automat-
ically structure information into databases, and automatic
trading sometimes relies on OCR to read certain news ar-
ticles for determining the sentiment of news.
Unfortunately, OCR also inherits all counter-intuitive se-
curity problems of the DNNs. Especially, the OCR model is
also vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are crafted
by making human-imperceptible perturbations on original
images with the intent of misleading the model. The wide
adoption of OCR in real pipelines gives more incentives for
adversaries to game the OCR, such as causing fake ID in-
formation, incorrect readings of metrics or instructions, etc.
Figure 2 and 3 in the evaluation section illustrate two real-
world examples with attacking the ID number and financial
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report number. This paper provides a preliminary study on
the possibility of OCR attacks.
Many prior works (Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune 2015;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Papernot et al.
2016a; Szegedy et al. 2013) have shown that changing the
prediction of DNNs is practicable by applying carefully-
designed perturbations (usually background noise) to orig-
inal images, in traditional image classification tasks. Recent
projects, Adversarial Patch (Brown et al. 2017) and LaVAN
(Karmon, Zoran, and Goldberg 2018), introduced the adver-
sarial patch attack, which puts visible perturbations confined
to a small region or location in the image.
However, these methods are not directly applicable to
OCR attacks for the following three reasons:
First, the input image to OCR is on a white paper with a
spotless background. Thus any perturbation added by exist-
ing attacks will appear so obvious to human readers that it
will cause suspicion.
Second, in complex languages like Chinese, there are
many characters (e.g., the dataset we use contains 5,989
unique characters). If an adversary wants to perform a tar-
geted attack, i.e., changing one character to another specific
one (target) in a sentence and meanwhile resulting in se-
mantically meaningful recognition results, it requires a large
number of perturbations that are too obvious to hide.
Third, instead of classifying characters individually, the
modern OCR model is an end-to-end neural network, in-
puting a variable-sized image and outputting sequences of
labels. In other words, it works on feeding images line by
line. It is usually called the sequential labeling task, which
is relatively harder to be attacked than the image classifica-
tion task. It is insufficient to just add perturbations to a sin-
gle character. Instead, the perturbations are required to span
multiple characters. Also, as the OCR model is end-to-end,
the internal feature representations rely on nearby charac-
ters (contexts). Thus the perturbations of attacking a single
character are designed given its contexts.
In this preliminary study, we propose a new attack
method, WATERMARK attack, against modern OCR mod-
els. Watermarks are images or patterns commonly used in
documents as background to identify things, such as mark-
ing a document proprietary, secret, urgent, or even simply as
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decoration. Similar to watermarks, in Asian countries, doc-
uments often contain stamps to verify their authority. Hu-
man eyes are so used to these watermarks and ignore them.
In this paper, we generate natural watermark-style perturba-
tions. That is, we limit all perturbations within a small region
of the image, i.e., a watermark. Given the bound, we mini-
mize the perturbation level. In comparison, classic adversar-
ial examples spread noise all over the image. Our approach
is similar to the patch-based attacks (Brown et al. 2017;
Karmon, Zoran, and Goldberg 2018). Different from that
patches absolutely cover part of the images, watermarks
do not hinder text’s readability and thus look more natu-
ral. (Heng, Zhou, and Jiang 2018) generated disguising per-
turbations as shadows, exposure problems or color prob-
lems. And (Hanwei Zhang 2019) generated smooth noise
by Laplacian smoothing. But none of these solve the clear
background challenge for OCR.
We focus on white-box, targeted attack in this paper. That
is, we assume adversaries have perfect knowledge of the
DNN architecture and parameters (white-box model) and
aim to generate specific recognition results (targeted attack).
Given that many real OCR softwares are based on similar
open-source OCR DNN models, we believe the white-box
model, in addition to being a starting point, also has real-
world applicability.
As a consequence, the WATERMARK attack is an adver-
sarial attack on the OCR model. The WATERMARK attack at-
taches natural watermark-style noise, tricks the OCR model
into outputting specific recognition results, and preserves the
readability of adversarial images at the same time. To some
extent, the WATERMARK attack solves the clear background
problem.
As an evaluation, we performed the WATERMARK at-
tack on a state-of-the-art open-source OCR model using
DenseNet + CTC neural network architectures for the Chi-
nese language. We used a dataset with 3.64 million images
and 5,989 unique characters. With 158 pairs of original-
target, we show that the WATERMARK attack can generate
quite human-eye friendly adversarial samples with a high
probability of success. Some of WATERMARK adversarial
examples even work on Tesseract OCR (Google 2019) in a
black-box manner.
Even more, we applied our model to real-world scenarios.
In Figure 3, we employed the WATERMARK method to a
page of an annual report of a listed Chinese company and
changed the semantics, in the meantime, the image looks
natural to human readers.
The contributions of this paper include: 1) We propose
the WATERMARK adversarial attack to generate natural-
to-human watermark-style perturbations, targeting DNN-
based OCR systems. We also demonstrated a method to
hide perturbations that human eyes are accustomed to,
in a watermark-bounded region . 2) Using difficult OCR
cases (Chinese), we demonstrated the success rate of
WATERMARK attacks comparing to existing ones.
Background and Related Work
Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
Generally, the OCR pipeline, as shown in Figure 1, begins
with line segmentation, which includes page layout analysis
for locating the position of each line, de-skewing the image,
and segmenting the input image into line images. After pre-
processing line images, such as rescaling and normalizing,
such images are fed into the recognition model, which out-
puts recognition results.
There are two types of OCR models. 1) Character-based
models are the classic way (Smith 2007). Such a recog-
nition model segments the image into per-character sub-
images and classifies each sub-image into the most likely
recognition result. Obviously, its performance heavily relies
on the character segmentation. 2) End-to-end models are a
segmentation-free approach. It recognizes entire sequences
of characters in a variable-sized image. (Bengio et al. 1995;
Espana-Boquera et al. 2011) adopted sequential models.
(Breuel et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2012) utilize DNNs as the
feature extractor for the end-to-end sequential recognition.
Sequential DNN models (Graves et al. 2006) introduced a
segmentation-free approach, connectionist temporal classifi-
cation(CTC), which allows variable-sized input images and
output results.
In end-to-end models, sequence labeling is a task that
assigns a sequence of discrete labels to variable-sized se-
quential input data. In our case, the input is a variable-
size image x and the output is a sequence of characters
t = [t1, t2, ..., tN ], ti ∈ T from predefined character set
T .
Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC). CTC is an
alignment-free method for training DNNs on the sequen-
tial labeling task, which provides a kind of loss enabling us
to recognize sequences without explicit segmentation while
training DNNs. Therefore, many state-of-the-art OCR mod-
els use CTC as the model’s loss function. Given the input
image x, let f(x) = y = [y1, y2, ..., yM ] be the sequence of
model f ’s outputs, where M ≥ N and yi ∈ [0, 1]|T | is the
probability distribution over the character set T in observing
label i.
CTC requires calculating the likelihood p(t|x), which is
barely directly measured from the model’s probability dis-
tribution f(x) and the target sequence t. To settle this,
CTC uses a valid alignment a = [a1, a2, ..., aM ] of t,
ai ∈ T ∪ {blank}, where the target sequence t can be ob-
tained by removing all blanks and sequential duplicate char-
acters (e.g. both [a, –, a, b, –] and [–, a, a, –, –, a, b, b] are
valid alignments of [a, a, b]). The likelihood p(t|x) is to sum
up the probability of all possible valid alignments denoted as
A.
p(t|x) =
∑
a∈A
M∏
i=1
p(ai|x) =
∑
a∈A
M∏
i=1
(yi)ai (1)
The negative log-likelihood of p(t|x) is the CTC loss func-
tion `CTC(f(x), t).
`CTC(f(x), t) = − log p(t|x) (2)
To obtain the most probable output sequence
arg maxt p(t|x), a greedy path decoding algorithm
can select the most probable alignment at each step.
However, the greedy algorithm does not guarantee to find
the most probable labeling. A better method, beam search
decoding, simultaneously keeps a certain number of the
most probable alignments at each step and chooses the most
probable output in the top-alignment list.
Attacking DNN-based computer vision tasks
Where to add perturbations? Attacking DNN models is
a popular topic in both computer vision and security fields.
Many projects focus on finding small Lp-bounded pertur-
bations, hoping that the bound Lp will keep the perturba-
tions visually imperceptible. FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014), L-BFGS (Szegedy et al. 2013), Deep-
Fool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016), Car-
lini L2, L∞ (Carlini and Wagner 2017), PGD (Madry et al.
2017) and EAD (Chen et al. 2018) all performed modifica-
tions at the pixel level by a small amount bounded by .
Other attacks such as JSMA (Papernot et al. 2016a),
Carlini L0 (Carlini and Wagner 2017), Adversarial
Patch (Brown et al. 2017) and LaVAN (Karmon, Zoran, and
Goldberg 2018), perturb a small region of pixels in an image
but the pixel-level perturbations are not bounded by Lp.
As we have mentioned, neither approach can hide per-
turbations from the normal human vision in OCR tasks, as
a document with enough readability usually has a spotless
background and vivid text, which is greatly different from
natural RGB photos.
How to generate perturbations? There are two types of
methods to generate perturbations.
1) Gradient-based attack is to add perturbations generated
by gradient against input pixels. Formally, we can describe
the general problem as: For a L∞-bounded adversary, we
compute an adversarial example x′ given an original image
x and target labels t where perturbations’ bound  > 0 is
tiny enough to be indistinguishable to human observers.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014) is a one-step attack that obtains the ad-
versarial image x′ as x +  · sign(∇x`(x′, t)). The original
image x takes a gradient sign step with step size  in the di-
rection that increases the probability of the target label t. It
is efficient, but it only provides a coarse approximation of
the optimal perturbations.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016) takes multiple smaller steps α and the result
image is clipped by the same bound : x′i = x
′
i−1+clip(α ·
sign(∇x`(x′i−1, t))), where x′i is an adversarial example
yielded at step i. BIM produces superior results to FGSM.
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) (Dong et al. 2018)
extends BIM with a momentum item. MIM can not only
stabilize update directions but also escape from poor local
maxima during the iteration. Thus, it generates more trans-
ferable adversarial examples. Each iterative update is to ad-
just the update direction and generate new adversarial im-
age x′i using the momentum item gi, as following gi =
µ · gi−1 + ∇x`(x
′
i−1,t)
‖∇x`(x′i−1,t)‖p ,x
′
i = x
′
i−1 + clip(α · sign(gi)),
where µ is the decay factor.
2) Optimization-based attack directly solves the opti-
mization problem of minimizing the Lp distance between
the original example x and the adversarial example x′ and
yielding the incorrect classification.
minimize ‖x′ − x‖p
subject to f(x′) = t and x′ ∈ [xmin,xmax]|x| .
Box-constraint L-BFGS (Szegedy et al. 2013) finds the
adversarial examples by solving the box-constraint prob-
lem, minimize λ ‖x′ − x‖p + `(x′, t) subject to x′ ∈
[xmin,xmax]
|x|, where `(x′, t) is the cross-entropy loss be-
tween the logit output and the target label t. Although the
perturbations generated by L-BFGS are much less than the
gradient-based attack, L-BFGS has far low efficiency.
C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017) is a Lp-oriented attack
that can successfully break undefended and defensively dis-
tilled DNNs. Given the logit Z of the model f , other than
applying cross-entropy as the loss function, C&W attack de-
signed a new loss function `(x′, t) = max(max{Z(x′)i :
i 6= t} − Z(x′)t,−κ) solved by gradient descent, where κ
is the confidence of misclassification.
Defense methods against these attacks
People have proposed many practical defense methods
against adversarial examples. Adversarial training (Trame`r
et al. 2017) improves the robustness of DNNs by injecting
label-corrected adversarial examples into the training proce-
dure and training a robust model that has a resistance to per-
turbations generated by gradient-based methods. Defensive
distillation (Papernot et al. 2016b) defends against adversar-
ial perturbations using the distillation techniques (Hinton,
Vinyals, and Dean 2015) to retrain the same network with
class probabilities predicted by the original network. There
are also methods focusing on detecting adversarial sam-
ples (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017; Lu, Issaranon, and Forsyth
2017; Grosse et al. 2017; Feinman et al. 2017).
Methodology
Preliminaries. We assume that attackers have full knowl-
edge of the threat model, such as the model architec-
ture and parameter values. Given an input image x ∈
[xmin,xmax]
|x|, an adversarial image x′ ∈ [xmin,xmax]|x|
where |x| is the number of pixels in the original image,
OCR model f , the adversarial example’s prediction result
is f(x′). Given target label t, loss function of the target
model f with respect to the input image x is `(x, t). Be-
sides, we assume f(x) to be differentiable almost every-
where (sub-gradient may be used at discontinuities). Be-
cause the gradient-descent approach is applicable to any
DNNs with a differentiable discriminant function.
Distance Metric. We define the distance metric Lp to quan-
tify the similarity between the original image x and the cor-
responding adversarial image x′. Such a distance metric re-
flects the cost of manipulations. Lp-norm is a widely-used
distance metric defined as ‖x− x′‖p = p
√∑d
i=1 |xi − x′i|p
where d-dimensional vector x = [x1, ..., xd] for any p ∈
{0, 1, 2,∞}. L1 accounts for the total variation in the per-
turbations and serves as a popular convex surrogate function
of the L0 that measures the number of modified pixels. L2
measures the standard Euclidean distance, which is usually
used to improve the visual quality. L∞ measures the maxi-
mum change of the perturbations between x and x′.
WATERMARK attack to CTC-based OCR
In this paper, we propose the MIM-based WATERMARK at-
tack on the CTC-based OCR model to generate adversar-
ial examples. In this section, we will first introduce how to
integrate watermarks into MIM (Dong et al. 2018) , which
induces the MIM-based WATERMARK attack method (WM)
to generate adversarial examples satisfying the L∞-norm re-
striction in the targeted and non-targeted attack fashion. We
then present several variants of WM to L∞-norm bound.
The generation pipeline of the WATERMARK adversarial at-
tack is illustrated in Figure 1. Table 1 shows adversarial ex-
amples generated from each method.
MIM-based WATERMARK attack (WM). Watermark
widely occurs in a mass of documents and files. Making use
of the popularity of the watermark in the documents, we ap-
ply the idea of the watermark to decorate perturbations as
the watermark; that is, we restrict the manipulation region
on a specific predefined watermark-shape region Ω.
To generate a targeted L∞-bounded adversarial example
x′, we start with an initial image x′0 = x given an original
image x. WM seeks the adversarial example by solving the
constrained optimization problem
arg min
x′
`CTC(x
′, t)
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤  and (1− Ω) (x′ − x) = 0,
where  is the size of adversarial perturbations and Ω =
{o ∈ Ω|o = 1 inside the watermark, otherwise, o = 0,Ω ∈
{0, 1}|x|}. We summarized WM in Algorithm 1. At each
attacking iteration i, the attacker first feeds the adversarial
example x′i to the OCR model f and obtain the gradient∇x`CTC(x′i, t) through back-propagation. Then, for the pur-
pose of stabilizing update directions and escaping from poor
local maxima, update momentum item gi+1 by accumulat-
ing the velocity vector in the gradient direction as Equation
3 shown in Algorithm 1. Last, update new adversarial ex-
ample x′i+1 by applying the Ω-restricted sign gradient with
small step size α, and clip the intermediate perturbations to
ensure them in the -ball of x′0 as Equation 4. The attacking
iteration proceeds until the attack is successful or reaches
the maximum iterations I .
Variants of WM attack. To present a more natural ap-
pearance of watermark-like perturbations, we design three
variants of WM attack.
WMinit. Watermark region Ω element-wisely multiplies the
sign gradient sign(gi+1) which attackers only operate pixels
inside the watermark region Ω. As shown in the WM column
of Table 1, the perturbations of WM adversarial examples
Algorithm 1 MIM-based WATERMARK example generation
Input: A clean image x, OCR model f with CTC loss `CTC,
ground-truth text f(x), targeted text t, watermark modification
region Ω, -ball perturbation, # of iterations I , decay factor µ
Output: An adversarial example x′ with ‖x′−x‖∞ ≤  or attack
failure ⊥
1: Initialization: α = /I; g0 = 0; x
′
0 = x
2: for all each iteration i = 0 to I − 1 do
3: Input x′i to f and obtain the gradient∇x`CTC(x′i, t)
4: Update gi+1 by accumulating the velocity vector in the gra-
dient direction as
gi+1 = µ · gi +
∇x`CTC(x′i, t)
‖∇x`CTC(x′i, t)‖p
(3)
5: Update x′i+1 by applying watermark-bound sign gradient as
x′i+1 = x
′
i + clip(α · Ω sign
(
gi+1
)
) (4)
6: if f(x′i+1) == t then
7: return x′ = x′i+1
8: end if
9: end for
10: return failure ⊥
are not dense enough to construct a complete watermark and
be a natural watermark. Thus, for filling in the blanks of the
watermark region, we start from an initial watermark-pasted
image by attaching a watermark to the original image, x′0 =
x + λ · (x > τ)  Ω, where λ is the grayscale value of the
pasted watermark and (x > τ) denotes the position except
the text.
WMneg. The sign of the gradient, sign(·), can be -1 or +1
based on the direction of gradient descent. When the gra-
dient is positive, sign(·) = 1, the pixel value will increase,
that is, the pixel looks whiter (the maximum of the grayscale
value mean the whitest color or else blackest color). Other-
wise, the pixel value decreases, and the pixel looks blacker.
Obviously, the pixels in the text region become whiter result-
ing in the fuzzy text, and it’s meaningless to whiten the clear
white background. Thus, we only need to keep the negative
gradient and leave the positive gradient behind. We gener-
ated WM noise but only kept the negative gradient during
attacking iteration. After adding the new constraint, the up-
date step of new adversarial example, Equation 4, becomes
x′i+1 = x
′
i + clip(α · Ωmin(0, sign
(
gi+1
)
)). (5)
WMedge. A different way to add perturbations is to confine
watermark region around the text edges, pretending to be
defectives in printing.
WMedge is similar with WM. We define the watermark as
the region of the text edge, which can be obtained by image
erosion in morphological image processing. The erosion op-
eration	 erodes the original image using the specified struc-
turing element that determines the shape of a pixel neigh-
borhood over which the minimum is taken. In experiments,
we use a 3 × 3 rectangular structuring element as a kernel,
K := 13×3. We take the bolder text region after erosion as
MIM
back-propagation
Watermark 𝜴WATERMARK
文字图片
Clean Text Image	𝒙 Perturbation
watermark-like
perturbation
Adversarial Example	𝒙′文字图片 adversarialtext 𝒕DenseNet
CTCOCR Model
Figure 1: The pipeline of the WATERMARK attack. We generate noise using MIM with CTC loss function back propagating the targeted
DenseNet and then mask the noise outside the watermark region. We iterating the procedure above until an iterations threshold.
original MIM WM WMinit WMneg WMedge OCR output English translation
su
bs
tit
ut
io
n
drive left→
drive right
1 Sep.→9 Sep.
I am Xiao Fang→
I am Sun Fang
hire→fire
class is over at 1→
class is over at 2
− class is over at 1→once class is over
+
class is over at 1→
class is not over at 1
Table 1: Adversarial examples with different attacks. The last two rows show text deletion and insertion. Other rows show text substitution.
the watermark. Thus, the text-edge shape watermark Ωedge is
defined as Ωedge = {o ∈ Ωedge|o =
{
1, if x	K > τ
0, if x	K ≤ τ }.
Experiments
In this section, we generate adversarial examples on the
CTC-based OCR model. We compared the performance of
the basic MIM, WM, and its variants.
Setup
Threat model. We performed WM attack on the DenseNet
+ CTC neural network 1 which is trained in the Chinese text
image dataset. DenseNet (Huang et al. 2017) is one of pow-
erful DNNs for visual recognition, which can capture com-
plex features. Thus, we utilize DenseNet as the feature ex-
tractor and CTC (Graves et al. 2006) as the loss function. In
the test phase, the DenseNet+CTC OCR recognition model
achieved 98.3% accuracy on the validation dataset that in-
volves 36400 images. The Chinese text image dataset has
3.64 million images that are generated by altering fonts,
scale, grayscale, blur, sketch based on Chinese news articles.
The character set has 5989 unique characters, including Chi-
nese and English characters, digits, punctuations.
1https://github.com/YCG09/chinese ocr
Attack setting. The attack setting is applied among all ex-
periments. Our experiment setup is based on MIM’s frame-
work. We use the implementation of MIM in CleverHans
package2. We use the attack setting which runs I = 1000
iterations at the most. We utilize an early stopping criterion
based on the attacking result at each iteration. The L∞-norm
perturbations  is bounded by 0.2. The pixel value of the im-
age ranges from 0 (black) to 1 (white). For the initial water-
mark in WMinit, we set the grayscale value λ of the water-
mark to 0.3, and we put the watermark in the center of the
image by default. The watermarks are set to the font size 30.
Choose attacked candidates. To satisfy the semantic
fluency in our OCR attack, we choose 691 pairs of
antonym characters with high similarity of character shape,
Sim(c, c′) > 0.6 3, so that the adversarial attack only re-
quires adversarial perturbations as less as possible to fool
the OCR system. Then we match selected antonym charac-
ter pairs in the corpus of People’s Daily in1988 and choose
2https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhan
3Given two characters c and c′, character similarity is defined
as Sim(c, c′) = w1Stroke(c, c′) + w2Sijiao(c, c′) + w3Edit(c, c′)
where Stroke(c, c′) denotes the absolute value of strokes between
c and c′. Sijiao(c, c′) is the Levenshtein distance of sijiao between
c and c′, which is an encoding approach to fast retrieving Chinese
characters. Edit(c, c′) is edit distance of character images between
c and c′. The weights w1, w2 and w3 is chosen as 0.33, 0.33 and
0.34, respectively.
158 sentences containing selected characters which do not
cause syntactic errors after substituting the corresponding
antonym character. Last, we generate the line image con-
taining chosen sentences.
Evaluation metrics. To quantify perturbations of adversar-
ial images x′ compared with benign images x, we measure
perturbations from MSE, PSNR and SSIM. Mean-squared
error (MSE) denotes the difference between adversarial im-
ages and original images, calculated by MSE = 1|x|‖x −
x′‖2. Peak-signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) is a ratio of max-
imum possible power of a signal and power of distortion,
calculated by PSNR = 10 log
(
D2
MSE
)
where D denotes the
dynamic range of pixel intensities, e.g., for an 8 bits/pixel
image we haveD = 255. Structural similarity index (SSIM)
attempts to model the structural information of an image
from luminance, contrast and structure respectively.
To evaluate the efficiency of adversarial attacks,
we calculate attack success rate (ASR) by ASR =
#(f(x′)=t)+#(f(x)6=f(x′))
#(x) that is the fraction of adversarial
images that were successful in fooling the DNN model, tar-
geted attack success rate (ASR*) of adversarial attacks cal-
culated as ASR∗ = #(f(x
′)=t)
#(x) , the average time to generate
adversarial perturbations from the clean images.
Comparison of attacks on single character altering
We compare different methods of altering a single charac-
ter. Table 1 shows some successful adversarial examples that
different attack methods generated. Our intuitions are: 1)
MIM generates human-perceptible and unnatural noise on
account of the dirty background, which distributes all over
the image, and harms the image structure similarity and im-
age quality. 2) WM and its variants retain the noise in the
watermark region bringing in a more clear background and
reasonable perturbations. 3) The watermark-fashion pertur-
bations of WM are relatively light, and do not look like a real
watermark. 4) WMinit and WMneg look more real with darker
and more complete watermark’s shape. 5) The perturbations
of WMedge are around the edge of the text, which makes the
text looks bolder and similar to printing/scanning defects.
Intuitively, we can see that WM family of attacks generate
better visual quality (in terms of looking natural) images if
the attack is successful.
We evaluate the attack performance of altering a single
character using the corpus discussed above. In Table 2, we
report the metrics above (MSE/PSNR/SSIM,ASR*/ASR),
as well as the average time required to generate an attack
sample. Our observations are: 1) From Table 2 , compared to
MIM, we can observe that WM, WMneg and WMedge obtained
lower MSE, higher PSNR and higher SSIM, indicating that
the noise level is indeed lower on a successful attack. 2) Due
to the lower noise level, the attack success rates (ASR* and
ASR) of WM and its variants are also lower than MIM’s. We
believe there are several reasons why they are lower. First, in
this preliminary study, we always choose a fixed shape and
location of the watermark that is at the center of the original
image. The fixed location severely limits what the adversary
can do. As our future work, we will allow multiple shapes
of the watermark (e.g., different texts, logos of the water-
mark), and different locations. 3) WMneg casts away the pos-
itive gradient noise which possesses a certain attack ability.
Hence, WMneg behaved worse than WM. However, WMneg
does generate more natural examples visually. 4) WMedge is
a special case of WM which restricts the watermark region to
the shape of the text edge, which has no location problem of
the watermarks like other WM-series methods. It achieved
good ASR and preserved the naturalness of perturbations.
It’s obvious to find that retaining all gradient noise is bet-
ter than only keeping the negative gradient noise. 5) WM0 is
to attach an initial watermark to the original image, which
can evaluate the impact of the watermark originally. After
attaching an initial watermark, 37.9% and 17.1% images are
misclassified by the DenseNet+CTC model and Tesseract
OCR, respectively. Thus watermark owns attacking proper-
ties intrinsically. 6) The time for producing each adversarial
example is similar and within a reasonable range. Thus, a
practical strategy is to combine different attack methods to
improve ASR.
Attack transferability to blackbox OCR
We want to see if adversarial examples can mislead other
(black-box) models, or have commonly called transferabil-
ity (Liu et al. 2016; Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow
2016; Sharma and Chen 2017; Papernot et al. 2017).
We adopt the widely-used latest version Tesseract
OCR (Google 2019) as a black-box model to perform ad-
versarial attacks. We fed the adversarial samples, which are
generated by attack methods above in the Densenet+CTC
model, into the off-the-shelf Tesseract OCR, and evalu-
ated recognition results (ASR*/ASR) shown in the last two
columns of Table 2.
We find that all attacks produce transferable adversarial
examples in terms of ASR. It may be due to the reason that
the noise indeed perturbs the intrinsic features of a character
sequence for different models, or because Tesseract OCR
cannot handle noise. However, ASR* reduces significantly
because perturbations are still trained on a different model.
Real-world examples
Figure 2 and 3 show two real-world examples of WM. In
Figure 2, using watermarks, we successfully altered the li-
cense number recognition results. Figure 3 shows an exam-
ple of a paragraph of an annual financial report of a public
company. By adding the AICS watermark, we altered all the
revenue numbers in the recognition results.
Defense against these attacks
We evaluate the robustness of these attacks against common
defense methods that preprocess the input images, and Ta-
ble 3 summarizes the results.
Noise removing methods with local smoothing. Local
smoothing makes use of nearby pixels to smooth each
pixel. We use three local smoothing methods from OpenCV
(OpenCV b), average blur, median blur and gaussian blur.
We observe that 1) median blur is particularly effective in
removing sparsely-occurring black and white pixels in an
DenseNet+CTC Tesseract OCR
MSE PSNR SSIM ASR* ASR Time (s) ASR* ASR
MIM 0.0102 32.27 84.92 92.4 93.7 20.8 19.6 84.2
WM 0.0020 34.70 96.03 60.8 61.4 17.5 19.0 88.0
WMneg 0.0023 34.26 94.11 52.5 53.2 20.7 19.6 88.6
WMinit 0.0094 34.64 89.02 55.1 71.5 19.9 0.0 100.0
WMedge 0.0058 34.43 93.87 87.3 88.0 13.5 19.6 83.5
WM0 0.0034 30.92 93.37 37.9 17.1
Table 2: Comparison of varing adversarial attacks on DenseNet+CTC and Tesseract OCR. See text for the metric definitions.
ASR*/ASR MIM WM WMneg WMinit WMedge example
no deformation 92.4/93.7 60.8/61.4 52.5/53.2 55.1/71.5 87.3/88.0
D
ef
or
m
at
io
n AvgBlur@2x2 44.30/62.7 47.47/51.27 46.84/54.43 18.99/79.11 48.73/55.06
MedianBlur@3x3 2.53/99.37 1.27/98.73 1.90/95.57 0.00/100.0 2.53/96.84
GaussianBlur@3x3,0 51.27/58.86 48.10/52.53 46.20/55.70 27.85/72.78 52.53/55.06
Salt&Pepper@2% 4.43/99.37 3.16/98.10 2.53/97.47 0.00/100.0 3.80/98.73
Compress@20 38.61/68.99 46.20/55.06 47.47/58.86 22.78/76.58 56.33/63.92
inpainting@2 0.00/100.0 0.00/100.0 0.00/100.0 0.00/100.0
Table 3: Comparison of ASR*/ASR (%) of adversarial examples under different preprocessing / defense methonds.
Figure 2: An adversarial attack example in driver li-
cense recognition. The OCR output a licenses number of
NAL12505717 while it is actually NHL12506717.
image while preserving edges of the text well. 2) Median
blur with kernel size 3 blurs texts so much that OCR algo-
rithms no longer work, although it reduces ASR*. 3) Aver-
age smoothing with kernel size 2 and Gaussian smoothing
with kernel size 3 have similar performance. Although MIM
has a high ASR, it seems more sensitive to various deforma-
tions than WM and WMedge.
Salt&pepper noise is a common way against adversarial
examples. We find that it is particularly effective in decreas-
ing ASR* (to 0), but the result is an increase of ASR to al-
most 100%. It indicates that salt&pepper noise harms the
general image quality too much in exchange for reducing
adversarial perturbations.
Image compression. We show that adversarial examples
can survive lossy image compression and decompression,
applying the standard JPEG compression method, with
the quality parameter is set to 20. We can point out that
WATERMARK attack has more chance of surviving under
the compression process.
Watermark removing techniques. Inpainting is a com-
monly used method to remove (real) watermarks. We use the
Figure 3: Attack on a listed Chinese company’s annual re-
port. All the revenue numbers are altered in the OCR result.
inpainting method (Telea 2004) implemented in OpenCV
(OpenCV a), which required the mask of watermarks as a
priori and tried to recover the watermark region according to
surrounding pixels. While inpainting eliminated the water-
mark, because the text region overlaped with the watermark
region, the inpainting method removed too many useful pix-
els, that is text pixels, causing OCR to fail completely. We
observe that the text even lost readability to human eyes.
Conclusion and Future Work
Generating adversarial examples for OCR systems is differ-
ent from normal CV tasks. We propose a method that suc-
cessfully hides perturbations from human eyes while making
them effective in the modern sequence-based OCR, by pre-
tending perturbations as a watermark, or printing defects.
We show that even with preliminary implementations, our
perturbations can be still effective, transferable, and deceiv-
ing to human eyes.
There are many future directions. For example, allow-
ing different watermark shapes and locations, as well as on
longer sequences. Also, it is interesting to add semantic-
based (language model) attacks even further to improve the
attack effectiveness. Also, the adversarial attack calls for
better defense methods other than traditional image trans-
formations.
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